We incorporate the behaviour of tax evasion into the standard two-dimensional Ising model and augment it by providing policy-makers with the opportunity to curb tax evasion via an appropriate enforcement mechanism. We discuss different network structures in which tax evasion may vary greatly over time if no measures of control are taken. Furthermore, we show that even minimal enforcement levels may help to alleviate this problem substantially.
The model
We use the standard Glauber kinetics of the Ising model on a 20 × 20 square lattice (in section 4 we will analyse our model for other lattice types). In every time period each lattice site is occupied by an individual who can either be an honest tax payer (S i = +1) or a tax evader (S i = −1). The small number of agents may be imagined to represent the elite of a country, whose tax evasion behaviour it may be interesting to look at, given the different enforcement regimes of the tax authority. For our analysis we assume that everybody is honest initially. Each period individuals have the opportunity to become the opposite type of agent as they were in the previous period. Each agent's social network, which is made up of four next neighbours, may either prefer tax evasion, reject it or be indifferent.
Tax evaders have the greatest influence to turn honest citizens into tax evaders if they constitute a majority in the given neighbourhood. If the majority evades, one is likely to also evade. On the other hand, if most people in the vicinity are honest, the respective individual is likely to become a decent citizen if she was a tax evader before. How strong the influence from the neighbourhood is can be controlled by adjusting the temperature, T . Total energy is given by the Hamiltonian H = − <i,j> J ij S i S j −B i S i . We choose J = 1 and B = 0. For very low temperatures, the autonomous part of decision-making almost completely disappears.
1 Individuals then base their decisions solely on what most of their neighbours do. A rising temperature has the opposite effect. Individuals then decide more autonomously. It is well known that for T > T c (≈ 2.269), half of the people are honest and the other half cheat, while for T < T c states coordinated on cheating or compliance prevail for most of the time.
As an enforcement measure, we introduce a probability of an efficient audit (p).
If tax evasion is detected, the individual must remain honest for a certain number of periods. We denote the period of time for which detected tax evaders are punished by the variable k. One time unit is one sweep through the entire lattice. Audits are stochastically independent from other agents and from the history any agent has.
3 Dynamics of the model - Figure 1 goes about here -
The top-left panel of Figure 1 illustrates the baseline setting, i.e. no use of enforcement, for the square lattice. We depict the dynamics of tax evasion over 50, 000 time steps. Although everybody is honest initially, it is not possible to predict which level of tax compliance will be reached at some time step in the future. Agents are usually either mostly compliant or mostly non-compliant, whereas the system typically remains in either state for a while. Switching from a mostly compliant to a mostly non-compliant society, or vice versa, is favoured by both the small number of agents and the temperature, which needs to be somewhere close to the critical level (we use T ≈ T c ). If, by chance, more than 50% of agents start to prefer the opposite action of the currently dominating one, this strategy will then start to prevail for a while.
As soon as there is a majority for the previously dominating strategy regarding tax evasion, aggregate behaviour is then likely to reverse again. If more agents or a temperature further below the critical level are picked, it would take longer for a switch in aggregate evasion behaviour to occur. Apparently, a suitable measure of control is needed to prevent agents from repeatedly falling into non-compliance.
- Figure In these variations of our simple square lattice model we also choose 400 agents and depict the resulting tax evasion dynamics over 50, 000 time steps.
The remaining pictures in Figure 1 illustrate the dynamics in the baseline setting in these additional network structures of our model. Both networks, the VoronoiDelaunay lattice and the Barabási-Albert network, support our findings in the case of the square lattice, namely that fluctuations in tax evasion behaviour may occur if no enforcement mechanism is implemented.
- Figure 3 goes about here - For the Voronoi-Delaunay random lattice we also find that fluctuations in tax evasion can be reduced substantially by implementing very low probabilities of an audit. For an audit rate of p = 1% no fluctuations occur any longer and society remains mainly honest over time. Obviously higher punishments, i.e. higher levels of k, also lower the amount of non-compliance.
The next two columns illustrate that enforcement in the Barabási-Albert network is less efficient than in the Voronoi-Delaunay network or in the simple square lattice.
As can be seen, fluctuations still occur for p = 1%, even for high levels of punishment (e.g. k = 10). The last column illustrates the tax evasion dynamics, holding the audit rate constant at p = 4.5%. This is the minimal audit rate which (almost always) prevents tax evasion from fluctuating, even for the lowest considered level of punishment (i.e. k = 1), and is much higher than in the other two network models, yet still at a realistic level.
Conclusion
Tax evasion can vary widely across nations, reaching extremely high values in some 
